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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper focuses on a sample of companies, which have been placed into administrative 
receivership, and attempts to assess whether financial ratios used by lending banks can be 
identified and used to discriminate between companies which can be rescued and those which 
will fail.  The distinctiveness of the paper lies in the fact that it applies conventional bank 
lending ratios, rather than prediction of failure ratios, to a sample of companies and is 
primarily concerned with the prediction of corporate survival rather than the prediction of 
corporate failure.  The research compares two statistical classification techniques - Linear 
Discriminant Analysis and Logistic Regression - to ascertain which is the best at predicting 
eventual outcomes.  A number of further issues, relating to which financial ratios are the most 
important in predicting future outcomes and the additional insight these financial ratios 
provide in helping to explain why companies move into crisis and why some companies are 
rescued and others fail, are also discussed in the paper. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Under UK legislation (Insolvency Act 1986) with its current emphasis on promoting a rescue 
culture, insolvent companies can either be liquidated or rescued as going concerns.  In the 
latter instance, companies can be placed either into administrative receivership or reorganised 
under a Corporate Voluntary Arrangement, with or without the protection of an 
Administration Order.  Against this legal framework, the research seeks to establish whether 
financial ratios normally used by lending banks to ascertain credit worthiness can be used to 
discriminate between companies which can be rescued and those which cannot.  This is an 
important question because administrative receivers are almost exclusively appointed by 
lending banks and they are also typically asked to give their approval to rescue schemes 
under voluntary arrangements.  If conventional bank lending ratios could be used in this way, 
it suggests that a significant amount of time, effort and expense could be saved.  Companies, 
for example, which might have otherwise been the subject of unsuccessful rescue attempts 
could be more readily identified and placed into immediate liquidation.  Conversely, 
companies which might have been placed directly into liquidation could be similarly 
identified as having a good chance of survival under a rescue package. 
    
Whilst recognising the important academic contribution of Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), 
Argenti (1976) and Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) in the prediction of corporate failure, Gilbert 
et al (1990) have argued that ex poste discrimination between risky companies which have 
failed and non-risky companies which have not has limited practical value.  As a 
consequence, Gilbert et al’s study focussed on whether financial ratios can be used to 
distinguish between weak companies that are destined to go into liquidation and weak 
companies that will avoid liquidation.  The overall accuracy of their model was 78.3 per cent 
with 90.6 per cent of weak firms that avoided insolvency being correctly predicted.  Perhaps 
more significant, however, was the fact that only 29.2 per cent of weak firms which 
eventually went into liquidation were correctly predicted. 
 
In developing this approach further, the paper reduces any ambiguity which could be 
associated with the term “weak companies” by focussing on a sample of companies which 
were placed into administrative receivership by their lending banks.  As such, the companies 
which comprise the sample have all experienced some form of crisis or “weakness” and are, 
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therefore, broadly comparable.  The real distinctiveness of the paper, however, lies in the fact 
that it applies conventional bank lending ratios to the sample in an attempt to predict whether 
the companies have a chance of being rescued.  In contrast to previous studies, therefore, the 
emphasis is on survival rather than failure and the ratios used in the analysis are typically 
associated with credit assessment rather than the prediction of failure. The paper also uses the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to compare and contrast two statistical 
classification techniques, namely, Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Logistic 
Regression (LR), in modeling the likely outcomes for the sample companies and in 
determining which of the financial ratios used in the analysis have the most predictive power. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Having regard for the above discussion, the research identified and focussed upon the 
following hypothesis:   
 
HO = it is possible to successfully predict the chances of recovery for a company placed into 
administrative receivership by using financial ratios used by lending banks. 
 
A further three research questions emanated from this overall hypothesis: 
 
• R1:  Which of the two classification techniques is the best at predicting eventual 
 outcomes? 
 
• R2:  What are the most important financial ratios in predicting the future likely 
 outcomes of companies placed into administrative receivership? 
 
• R3:  What insights do these financial ratios provide in helping to explain why 
companies become weak and why some are rescued and others liquidated? 
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CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES 
 
Linear Discriminant Analysis 
 
Discriminant analysis refers to several closely related activities used for deriving and 
interpreting a discriminant model which categorises individual cases into several pre-
specified classes (Klecka, 1980).  The most widely used discriminant model is the linear 
model (see, for example, Crook et al, 1992) which consists of one or more discriminant 
functions in the following form: 
 
 f(x) = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + ... + bnxn (1) 
 
 where: x = (x1, x2, ..., xn), 
        xi’s are explanatory variables, 
        bi’s are the estimated coefficients. 
 
Under certain assumptions, such as multivariate normality and equal covariance matrices, the 
coefficients can be derived using the Fisher procedure by maximizing the ratio of between 
groups variances to within groups variances.  The value of a discriminant function is called 
the discriminant score, which can be used directly for classification purposes1.  
 
Logistic Regression 
 
The logistic regression model is a probability model, which can directly estimate the 
probability of an event occurring (or not occurring), and can therefore be used in the binary 
classification problem (Draper and Smith, 1981; Breiman et al, 1993).  The logistic 
regression model, for more than one independent variable, can be written as: 
 
                        1 
 Prob (event)  =   ________    (2) 
                     1 + e-z 
 
 where: z  =  b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + ... + bnxn, 
  b’s  = estimated coefficients, 
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 e =  the base of the natural logorithms, 
 and Prob (no event) = 1 - Prob (event). 
 
The logistic regression model is a generalized linear model as the variables are used in the 
form of linear combinations.  The parameters are estimated using the maximum-likelihood 
method through an iterative non-linear regression procedure.  In practice, it has been 
suggested that the logistic regression approach is often preferred over discriminant analysis 
(Press and Wilson, 1978), although arguably the interpretation of the coefficients in a LR 
model are less obvious than in a LDA model. 
 
 
 
SAMPLE DATA 
 
The DTI Statistics Directorate revealed that in 1998 1,713 companies were placed into 
administrative receivership and financial information relating to some of these companies for 
the previous two years was available on the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) CD Rom 
database.  As the financial data on FAME is based on historical audited accounts, there was, 
however, a time discrepancy between the two sources of data.  Specifically, the financial data 
on FAME related to the period September 1996 to March 1998, ie approximately one to two 
years before some of the companies were placed into receivership.  Although it was 
recognised that this consideration could influence the classification results, it was not 
regarded as a major problem because lending bankers predominantly base their credit 
decisions on historical data contained in the latest audited accounts.  It was concluded, 
therefore, that the time discrepancy between the two sources of data broadly reflects the “real 
world” situation. 
 
The FAME database was, however, incomplete in two important respects:  firstly, subsidiary 
companies placed into receivership are reported as separate companies in the statistics, 
whereas the data in FAME is based on consolidated accounts.  Consequently, a high 
incidence of group companies placed into receivership increases the disparity between the 
two sources of data.  Secondly, the FAME database relates almost entirely to medium-large 
sized companies.  The authors estimate that at least 90 per cent of the companies on FAME 
had annual sales turnovers exceeding £500,000, a figure which approximated with the largest 
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10 per cent of companies registered in the UK in 1998.  These considerations reduced the 
sample to 120 medium-large sized companies. 
 
The London Gazette was used to identify the administrative receivers (ie the individual 
insolvency practitioners) responsible for each of these 120 companies.  However, the Gazette 
did not reveal the eventual outcomes of the receiverships.  Questionnaires were, therefore, 
forwarded to each of the named receivers requesting information about the eventual 
outcomes of the receiverships.  The remittance of the questionnaire resulted in 74 usable 
responses (see Table 1) and these revealed that 49 companies were sold on a complete or 
partial basis (designated “rescued” cases ) and 25 companies went into liquidation 
(designated “failed” cases). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
In terms of identifying and determining the appropriateness of the variables for inclusion in 
the analysis, twenty operating and financial ratios were considered, as shown in Table 2.  As 
discussed in Bathory (1987), these ratios are associated with credit assessment rather than the 
prediction of failure and are typical of the ratios used by lending bankers in granting and 
controlling credit facilities and in determining the appropriateness of an administrative 
receivership.   
 
Six ratios were eventually used in the analysis.  These included four operating ratios – gross 
profit (PM), ie profit before interest and tax/sales turnover; stock turnover (ST); debtor 
turnover (DT); and two financial ratios:  gearing ratios (GR), ie debt/equity, and the current 
ratio (CR), ie current assets/current liabilities.  The ratios not used in the analysis were 
excluded for a number of reasons.  It was difficult, for example, to calculate meaningful 
figures for capital employed because many of the companies had experienced substantial 
negative profits.  In addition, the FAME database did not contain consistent information on 
trade creditors, trading profits and interest paid.  Consequently, a number of ratios were 
excluded on the basis of missing values.  However, as most of these were correlated with the 
six ratios used in the analysis, this was not regarded as too serious a problem.  Possibly the 
only exception, in this respect, was interest gearing, ie PBIT/interest paid, which is not 
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correlated to any of the six ratios used in the analysis, but was omitted on the grounds of 
missing values. 
 
Although using conventional bank lending ratios is a move towards replicating the sort of 
criteria applied by banks when appointing administrative receivers, it was recognised that this 
approach could introduce a number of problems.  For example, whereas healthy companies 
usually have financial ratios which are broadly comparable, companies are placed into 
administrative receivership for a variety of different reasons and this typically reveals itself in 
a much wider spread of values for the financial ratios.  This suggested that the predictive 
structure of the data for insolvent companies might be less accurate than that for solvent 
companies.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Another problem stemmed from the fact that as the “actual” population of rescued and failed 
companies placed into administrative receivership during 1998 was not available, it was 
difficult to know what proportions of rescued and failed companies to include in the data set.  
Although this is not an issue when deriving functions (1) and (2), it is, however, a problem 
when it comes to assessing the performance of the functions.  In the case of discriminant 
analysis when the two groups are unequal, the prior probabilities influence the classification 
procedure (and favour the largest group), whereas if the groups are equal, each group’s prior 
probabilities are equal.2  Similarly with logistic regression, where you have two unequal 
groups, most cases will be assigned to the larger group regardless.  Consequently, it was 
decided to conduct the analysis by using two data sets from the sample: 
 
(i) data set RE74 (unequal groups) consisted of all 74 companies (49 rescued and 25 
failed); and 
 
(ii) data set RE50 (equal groups) consisted of 50 companies.  This data set included the 
25 failed companies and a further 25 companies were randomly selected from 49 
rescued companies. 
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Given the assumptions of the multivariate statistical techniques being used in this work, all 
the independent variables were tested for multicollinearity3 and only variables with a 
tolerance (see Crook et al, 1992) greater than 0.9 remained in any model. 
 
Given the nature of the data (ie all variables were continuous) and the relatively small sample 
size (ie n = 74), the values for each independent variable were split into categories or classes 
and the value for each class was calculated as the odds to be rescued (see Lewis, 1994). 
 
 
 Odds to be rescued =  Nr/Tr 
   Nf/Tf 
 
 where: Nr = number of rescued cases with values falling in the class, 
  Tr = total number of rescued cases, 
  Nf = number of failed cases with values falling in the class, 
  Tf = total number of failed cases. 
 
Therefore, the values of a variable were divided into a number of value classes, such that the 
spread of values within a class was minimised and the difference between classes was 
maximised.  For continuous variables, where the effect is not linear, this approach (see 
Hamilton and Khan, 1997) will provide more meaningful results and improve the predictive 
ability of the model.  
 
 
COMPARISON OF THE TWO CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 show the LDA and LR classification results for datasets RE74 and RE50 
respectively.  The “apparent rate” in these tables is the classification rate when using the 
same dataset for analysis and classification.  The estimated (or unbiased) classification rates 
were obtained through two validation methods (Eisenbeis, 1977): Jackknife and V-fold cross-
validation (7-fold for RE74 and 5-fold for RE50).  The explanatory variables are also ranked 
according to their relative importance, as estimated by the standardized canonical coefficients 
in the case of LDA and by the R-statistic (partial correlation) in the case of LR. 
 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 
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The results show that the performances of the two classification procedures are quite 
comparable, especially when all of the 6 explanatory variables are used.  The estimated 
classification rates are between 70 and 80 percent.  This is much higher than Cprop4, the 
expected classification rate determined by chance (Hair et al, 1987 and Crook et al, 1992). 
 
   Cprop (for dataset RE74) = (49/74)2 + (25/74)2 = 55.25% 
 
 and 
 
   Cprop (for dataset RE50) = (25/50)2 + (25/50)2 = 50.0%. 
 
The performance of the classification techniques on the equal-groups dataset RE50 was better 
than on the unequal-groups dataset RE74, in terms of both the apparent rate and the estimated 
rate.  Finally, the overall predictive accuracy of the models was between 85 - 90 percent for 
the “rescued” group, and between 55 - 60 percent for the “failed” group. 
 
 
INTERPRETATION OF THE KEY RATIOS 
 
Debtor Turnover 
 
The analysis revealed that when debtor turnover (DT) fell between 64 days (which was the 
average collection period in the sample) and 140 days, companies had a very good chance of 
being rescued:  27 out of 32 or just over 80 per cent of companies within this range were 
rescued.  When DT was less than 64 days, however, the chance of a company being rescued 
was much lower at 52.4 per cent.  This result was totally unexpected because a low debtor 
turnover figure is usually associated with efficient credit control and good management 
practice.  It is perhaps pertinent to emphasise, however, that the companies under 
examination had all been placed into administrative receivership and were, therefore, by 
definition either weak or experiencing problems.  In this respect perhaps these companies 
should not be regarded as typical or normal.  This finding, however, does raise an important 
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question about whether these companies are placing too much emphasis on credit control at 
the expense of marketing and sales promotion? 
 
In attempting to resolve this question, the analysis focussed on the 42 sample companies with 
a debtor turnover of less than 64 days and examined their turnover trends (TT).  This was 
calculated as the percentage change in turnover, ie an increase or decrease, over the two years 
set of accounts. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
As Table 5 shows, although these companies are comparable in terms of DT, they are far 
from homogenous in terms of TT or the eventual outcome of the receivership.  The largest 
group was the 26 companies which exhibited a declining TT and out of these 12 failed.  This 
observation seems to underline just how important a declining sales turnover is in indicating 
whether a company will move into difficulties and eventually fail.  The high failure rate in 
this category could be indicative of secular decline, ineffective marketing, obsolete products 
or price uncompetitiveness, etc, and reflects the attempts of management to survive by 
exclusively pursuing a rigorous credit control policy.  Regarding the 14 companies which 
were rescued, a similar policy of focussing on credit control is exhibited, but as these 
companies survived, there was presumably a viable business and a market which the original 
management failed to exploit.   
 
The 9 companies with TT between 0-15 per cent are simultaneously pursuing credit control 
and sales promotion policies.  Having regard for the UK rate of inflation in 1998 which was 
between 2-3 per cent, a sales turnover much beyond 4 per cent would have been acceptable, 
but sales growth in excess of this may have been indicative of overtrading.  These 
considerations, aligned with low debtor figures and taking into account the fact that the 
majority of these businesses were rescued, suggests that they were viable concerns but 
needed additional external finance to consolidate their positions.  The remaining 7 companies 
which exhibited TT greater than 15 per cent are similar to the middle range companies 
inasmuch as they are probably overtrading but to a much greater extent, and this probably 
explains why only one of them was rescued.  High sales turnover may also have been 
facilitated by substantial discounts and commensurately lower levels of profitability.  Under 
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these circumstances working capital would deteriorate and further explain the relatively high 
number of failed cases. 
  
Gearing Ratio  
 
The findings are also interesting with regard to the gearing ratio (Table 6).  It is generally 
accepted that lending banks do not normally lend more than the “net worth” of the company, 
with net worth typically including equity plus retained profits and capital revaluations less 
intangible assets such as goodwill, patents, etc.  The gearing ratio used in the analysis, 
however, was debt/equity and it was, therefore, anticipated that the ratio used in the analysis 
would tend to exaggerate or increase the level of gearing compared with the method of 
calculation normally used by banks.  On this basis, a gearing ratio falling below 2.0 was 
interpreted as being low; a gearing ratio falling within the range 2.0-10.0 was interpreted as 
being fairly normal; and anything in excess of this range was regarded as being high to 
excessive. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
Table 6 shows that companies with low gearing ratios, ie below 2.0, have a good chance of 
being rescued, as only 2 of the 12 cases in this category failed.  This suggests that these 
companies might have pursued too conservative a financial policy and, therefore, might have 
failed to fully exploit their sales potential and maximise their profitability.  The fact that most 
of these companies were rescued certainly suggested that they operated in viable markets, but 
perhaps needed additional external finance to consolidate and improve their performances. 
 
In contrast, companies in the gearing range 2.0-10.0, ie those which are fairly “normal”, have 
a much greater chance of not being rescued as 11 of the 17 failed.  This suggests that the 
problem for these companies is not so much a weak or conservative financial policy, but 
something rather more substantive, possibly relating to the external market.  It could, for 
example, be indicative of an obsolete  product or a lack of price competitiveness due to 
diseconomies of scale or poor factory layout, etc.  Companies in the two remaining ranges 
10.0-70.0 and >70.0 accounted for 61 per cent of the sample and this suggests that the 
majority of companies in the sample might have got into difficulty because of excessive bank 
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borrowing.  Rather interesting is the fact that these companies have a good chance of being 
rescued (15 out of 23 companies in the 10.0-70.0 range and 18 out of 22 companies in the 
>70.0 range) and this may once again be indicative of simply borrowing too much and having 
inadequate financial control.  The high incidence of rescued companies, however suggests 
that they are basically viable businesses operating in equally viable markets. 
 
Current Ratio 
 
The observed pattern with regard to the current ratio is shown in Table 7.  Before examining 
the results, however, it is perhaps appropriate to establish that there is no “ideal” or “norm” 
for the current ratio.  As with financial ratios generally, it is influenced by the industrial 
sector in which a company operates (Elliot and Elliot, 1993).  It is generally accepted, 
however, that banks will not lend unsecured on a current ratio of less than unity and a ratio of 
2:1 is generally regarding as providing additional comfort (Clemens and Dyer, 1979).  Table 
7 reveals that the majority of sample companies had current ratios of less than 1.10, ie just 
slightly greater than unity.  This was not unexpected as all of the companies were weak and 
had been placed into administrative receivership by commercial banks who are the principal 
external source of working capital to UK companies.  Low current ratios, combined with full 
security in the form of a mortgage debenture5, might also be reflecting the UK lending banks’ 
obsession with volumetric targeting.  As a consequence, marginal cases might have been 
sanctioned or allowed to continue trading on the basis that the banks were fully secured. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
The results, rather interestingly, did not reveal any significant difference between the current 
ratios of rescued and failed companies.  This would seem to suggest that although the current 
ratio might be useful as an early warning signal, it is essentially concerned with short-term 
liquidity rather than with insolvency and the long term survival of a company.  In fact, the 
results in Table 7 reveal a profile which is not dissimilar to that for gearing (shown in  
Table 6).  Companies, whose financial ratios fall into the two extreme ranges, have a good 
chance of being rescued, whereas companies in the middle ranges have a significantly less 
chance of being rescued. 
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In contrast to low gearing, however, a low current ratio is not normally associated with a 
conservative financial policy.  Rather it is connected with a substantial bank overdraft or a 
large outstanding taxation or trade creditor liability and may, therefore, be indicative of 
companies which are failing to generate sufficient cash flow to meet their immediate cash 
requirements.  Similarly, a high current ratio in contrast to high gearing is not normally 
associated with excessive borrowing, but rather is normally associated with high levels of 
debtors or work in progress, etc.  A build up of working capital, especially when a company 
is supposedly weak, may be indicative of poor internal management and relate to inadequate 
credit control, or an inappropriate pricing policy, etc, or reflect a lack of external 
competitiveness due to poor location or cyclical factors in the economy, etc.  As the majority 
of companies which fell into the two extreme ranges were rescued, there is a tendency to 
conclude that their problems were essentially concerned with inadequate internal 
management rather than with external market conditions. 
  
Companies which fell into the middle range for current ratios, ie 0.85 - 1.10, had only slightly 
more than a 50 per cent chance of being rescued.  This suggests that these companies may 
have substantial overdrafts which have been invested in illiquid current assets, typically 
stock, work in progress, debtors, etc.  Under these circumstances the current ratio will 
approximate to unity in that it will be “matched”, ie current liabilities will broadly equal 
current assets.  As with the middle ranges for gearing, this indicates that although these 
companies’ problems might have been exacerbated by poor internal management, the fact 
that a high proportion failed is probably more indicative of adverse market conditions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The research has examined the concept of prediction of “survivability” in corporate 
insolvency.  As the sample size was small, it is perhaps unwise to claim that the model is 
unbiased in estimating the survival potential of companies placed in receivership.  For similar 
reasons we would not even claim that the financial ratios identified in this study are 
necessarily the most useful in predicting rescue potential.  However, the research has shown 
some promising results on what is a difficult but potentially influential area of insolvency and 
commercial bank lending practice. 
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With respect to the research hypothesis (Ho), the research revealed classification rates 
between 70 and 80 per cent which is much higher than Cprop, the expected classification rate 
determined by chance.  The overall predictive accuracy of the models was between 85-90 per 
cent for the rescued companies and between 55-60 per cent for the failed group.  The paper 
also provided some interesting insights into the related research questions.  The performance 
of the two classification procedures (R1) were comparable, especially when all six financial 
ratios were used in the analysis.  In addressing the second research question (R2), the paper 
identified three ratios, namely the current ratio, debtor turnover and the gearing ratio, as 
being particularly discriminative.  As regards the final research question (R3), the ratios 
appeared to have explainable patterns and, therefore, provided tentative insights into why 
some companies were rescued and others failed.  Companies which were rescued typically 
exhibited either high or low current ratios, high or low gearing ratios and debtor turnover 
periods greater than sixty four days.  Moreover, when this ratio profile occurred with a 
positive sales turnover, the chances of being rescued increased.  In contrast, companies which 
failed typically had current and gearing ratios in the middle ranges, ie levels which are 
generally acceptable to lending banks.  Equally interesting was the increased likelihood of 
failure for companies with debtor turnover periods of less than sixty four days, especially 
when this coincided with constant or declining sales turnover. 
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that estimating the survival potential of companies is not the 
same as predicting the fates (outcomes) of companies under receivership, not least because 
the former are independent of the administrative receivers’ influence.  Another difference is 
that there is no standard for measuring the survival potential of “normal” companies, but the 
fate of companies placed into administrative receivership is known and is, therefore, 
measurable.  The ability to predict the fate of companies placed into administrative 
receivership is, therefore, both practical and useful.   
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NOTES 
 
1. The classification of cases can also be based on other rules such as Bayes Rule, for 
example. 
 
2. See Morrison (1969) for a fuller discussion on classification procedures. 
 
3. A situation where two or more independent variables are highly correlated which 
would make the relative importance of any single variable unreliable. 
 
4. Given that one objective of this research was to correctly classify members of both 
groups, the Cprop is a more appropriate measure of chance rather than the maximum 
chance criterion (Cmax) which would simply advise that all cases be assigned to the 
larger of the two groups. 
 
5. An administrative receivership is only appointable under a mortgage debenture 
incorporating a floating charge (Sec 2, Insolvency Act, 1986). 
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TABLE 1 
 
SAMPLE COMPANIES BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
 
 
 
 
Sector 
 
Frequency 
 
Rescued 
 
Failed 
 
 
Agriculture 
 
 1 
 
 1  
  
 - 
 
Mining  -  -  - 
 
Manufacturing  26  19  7 
 
Wholesale Distribution  8  5  3 
 
Retail  7  6  1 
 
Construction  15  5  10 
 
Transport  4  2  - 
 
Finance  10  8  2 
 
Other Services  1  1  - 
 
Hotel and Catering  2  2  - 
 
  74  49  25 
 
 
 
Note:   
 
1. Sales turnover: >£10 million 13 companies 
  £5-10 million 26 companies 
  £1-5 million 42 companies 
  <£1 million 22 companies 
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TABLE 2 
 
RATIOS CONSIDERED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
Financial Ratios Considered 
 
 
Ratios Used in the Analysis 
 
Operating Ratios 
 
PBIT/Turnover1 (PM) 
 
 
 
√ 
Trading Profit/Turnover  
Trading Profit/Capital Employed  
Overall Trends in Turnover (TT) √ 
Turnover/Capital Employed  
Stock/Turnover (ST) √ 
Trade Debtors/Turnover (DT) √ 
Debtors/Creditors  
Trade Debtors/Trade Creditors  
Trade Creditors/Cost of Purchases  
Trade Creditors/Turnover  
Working Capital/Turnover  
 
 
Financial Ratios 
 
Turnover/Net Fixed Assets 
 
Gearing Ratio2 (GR) √ 
Equity/Capital Employed  
PBIT/Interest  
Loan Capital/Capital Employed  
PBIT/Capital Employed  
Current Ratio3 (CR) √ 
Acid Test Ratio4 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
 
1. Gross profit margin = profit before interest and taxation/sales turnover. 
2. Gearing ratio = debt/equity. 
3. Current ratio = current assets/current liabilities. 
4. Acid test = current assets minus stock and WIP/current liabilities. 
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TABLE 3 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR DATASET RE74 (UNEQUAL GROUPS) 
 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Apparent 
Rate 
 
Estimated Rate 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
(Ranked in Order 
  Jackknife 7-fold 
 
of Importance) 
 
 
LDA (Enter) 
 
79.3 
 
73.0 
 
72.7 
 
DT, GR, CR, ST, PM, TT 
 
LDA (Stepwise) 74.3 74.3 75.3 GR, DT 
 
LR (Enter) 81.1 75.7 72.7 
 
DT, GR, CR, ST, PM, TT 
LR (Fwd-Stepwise) 
 
74.3 74.3 70.0 GR, DT 
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TABLE 4 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR DATASET RE50 (EQUAL GROUPS) 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Apparent 
Rate 
 
Estimated Rate 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
(Ranked in Order 
  Jackknife 5-fold 
 
of Importance) 
 
 
LDA (Enter) 
 
84.0 
 
78.0 
 
74.0 
 
DT, GR, CR, ST, PM, TT 
 
LDA (Stepwise) 80.0 76.0 80.0 GR, DT, CR 
 
LR (Enter) 84.0 74.0 76.0 DT, GR, CR, ST, PM, TT 
 
LR (Fwd-Stepwise) 
 
80.0 76.0 80.0 GR, DT, CR 
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TABLE 5 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE 42 CASES WITH DT LESS THAN 64 DAYS 
 
 
 
 
DT Debtor 
Turnover  
(in days) 
 
 
TT Turnover 
Trend (% 
annual change) 
 
 
Number of 
Rescued Cases 
 
Number of 
Failed Cases 
 
 
Total 
 
 
<64 
 
TT<0 
  
 14 (33) 
  
 12 (29) 
  
 26 (62) 
 
<64 0<TT<15  7 (17)  2 (5)  9 (21) 
 
<64 TT>15  1 (2)  6 (14)  7 (17) 
 
 
 
Note: 
 
1. Brackets denote percentages. 
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TABLE 6 
 
SURVIVAL PATTERN WITH RESPECT TO GEARING RATIO 
 
 
 
 
Gearing Ratio 
 
No of  
Rescued Cases 
 
No of  
Failed Cases 
 
 
Total 
 
 
0.00 - 2.0 
 
 10 (14) 
 
 2 (2) 
 
12 (16) 
 
2.0 - 10.0  6 (8)  11 (15) 17 (23) 
 
10.0 - 70.0  15 (20)  8 (11) 23 (31) 
 
> 70.0  18 (24)  4 (5) 22 (30) 
 
 
 
Note:  
 
1. N = 74 
2. Brackets denote percentages. 
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TABLE 7 
 
SURVIVAL PATTERN WITH RESPECT TO CURRENT RATIO 
 
 
 
 
Current Ratio 
 
No of Rescued Cases 
 
No of Failed Cases 
 
 
Total 
 
 
Lowest - 0.85 
 
 17 (23) 
 
 6 (8) 
 
 23 (31) 
 
0.85 - 1.10  13 (18)  12 (16)  25 (34) 
 
 >1.10  19 (26)  7 (9)  26 (35) 
 
 
 
Note:  
 
1. N = 74 
3. Brackets denote percentages. 
 
 
